



**Surveying the Literature on  
Counter-Terrorism, Counter-  
Insurgency, and Countering  
Violent Extremism:  
A Summary Report with a Focus on  
Africa**

*Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment  
Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of  
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National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism  
A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence  
Based at the University of Maryland

8400 Baltimore Ave., Suite 250 • College Park, MD 20740 • 301.405.6600

[www.start.umd.edu](http://www.start.umd.edu)

## About This Report

The author of this report is Amy Pate, Research Director at START, University of Maryland. Questions about this report should be directed to Amy Pate at [apate@start.umd.edu](mailto:apate@start.umd.edu).

The following research assistants helped with the background research for the report: Delaney Rohan, Greg Shuck, Arielle Kushner, and Jacob Schwoerer.

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## About START

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START uses state-of-the-art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at [infostart@start.umd.edu](mailto:infostart@start.umd.edu) or visit [www.start.umd.edu](http://www.start.umd.edu).

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## **Executive Summary**

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) was tasked with reviewing the literature relevant to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in support of the broader project *U.S. Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa*, funded and coordinated by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA) of the Department of Defense. This report is a summary of the key findings of a broader literature survey on counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and countering violent extremism. The survey focused on empirical evaluations of policies designed to undermine the ability or motivation of non-state actors to engage in political violence.

Finally, a simplified schema was used to categorize policies, including the following:

- Coercion: including strategies based on violence or the threat of violence;
- Denial: including strategies intended to raise the costs of attacks or lower the benefits to reduce the likelihood of violence;
- Delegitimization: including strategies aimed at undermining the legitimacy of violent organizations;
- Incentivization: including strategies aimed at increasing interest in or viability of nonviolent pathways to change

Key findings include:

- Most literature addressing counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and/or countering violent extremism does not include empirical evaluations of specific policies.
- A majority of studies with evaluation find that use of coercive methods such as repression (especially when used exclusively and indiscriminately) tend to produce backlash effects.
- Analysis of denial strategies focus on the hardening of targets. Such studies have generally found that while target hardening decreases attacks on that type of target, it does not result in an overall decrease in violence;
- Deradicalization programs, especially those run in prisons, are the primary delegitimization effort targeting group leaders and members that has been subjected to empirical evaluation. Most studies find positive effects, but few include follow-up over time (or after release, for prison-based programs).
- While multiple authors hypothesize that countering extremist narratives is critical to reduce the appeal of violent extremism, there has been very little scholarship in terms of empirical studies to test the efficacy of counter-narratives in general or of specific strategic communication programs or content.
- While negotiations, an incentivization strategy, sometimes result in decreased violence, attempts at cross-national, generalizable studies have not found negotiations to have a significant effect on political violence.

Some of the main shortcomings of the literature identified during the literature survey include:

- Shortage of empirical analyses of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and CVE policies and programs;
- Geographic constraints in analytic foci;
- Lack of attention to path dependence; and
- Relative absence of boundary and limit testing of findings.

## Introduction

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) was tasked with reviewing the literature relevant to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in support of the broader project *U.S. Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa*, funded and coordinated by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA) of the Department of Defense.

The literature on counter-terrorism is as divided on definitional issues as is the literature on terrorism, with a many sources leaving the term undefined. For the purposes of this review, the research team focused on assessments of policies where the stated purpose was undermining the ability or motivation of non-state actors to engage in political violence. This report is a summary of the key findings of a broader literature survey.

The review is organized as follows. First, various frameworks for categorizing policies are discussed. Then, the methodology employed to identify relevant works and extract information from them is described. The literature is then synthesized and summarized, organized by type of intervention and target of intervention, with a focus on empirically validated findings. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the current state of the literature, with a focus on Africa.

## Frameworks

Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policies can be conceptualized and categorized by a variety of frameworks. Some authors have used the PMESII/DIME<sup>1</sup> model,<sup>2</sup> although others have questions the applicability of PMESII dimensions to non-state actors.<sup>3</sup> This configuration, which is amenable to systems modeling, results in DIMEFIL actions having PMESII effects.

Davis and Jenkins propose another influence typology, arrayed along an “escalation ladder of coerciveness,” including the following rungs:

- Co-opt,
- Induce positively,
- Persuade,
- Dissuade,
- Deter by threat,
- Deter by increasing risks and disruption,

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<sup>1</sup> PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) are dimensions used by the U.S. military to describe the nature and capabilities of enemies and/or allies, while DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) are dimensions measuring elements of national power. Some analysts expand the elements of national power to include Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL).

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Hartley III, Dean S. 2014. “DIME/PMESII Models.” In *Conflict and Complexity: Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, Ethnic and Regional Violence*, Philip vos Fellman and Yaneer Bar-Yam, Ali A. Minai. New York: Springer, 111-136.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Arnold, Kris A. 2006. “PMESII and the Non-State Actor: Questioning the Relevance.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.

- Deter by denial,
- Deter next time by punishing now,
- Deter next time by defeating now, and
- Deter next time by crushing now.<sup>4</sup>

Davis and Jenkins also suggest disaggregating the potential targets of influence operations, for example by distinguishing leaders from foot-soldiers from financiers from sympathizers.<sup>5</sup>

Under a previous SMA-funded effort on *Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations* (I-VEO), influence activities were categorized using both the DIMEFIL and Davis and Jenkins schema. Additionally, other schema were developed for the effort. Following the advice of Davis and Jenkins, potential targets of influence strategies were decomposed into the following categories: leaders, loyalists, active followers, ideological influences, material supporters, broader audience, and state-based support.<sup>6</sup> Jeffrey Knopf developed a multilevel scheme, as follows:<sup>7</sup>

- Military Deterrence/Coercion
  - Direct Punishment
    - Retaliation against the VEO
    - Retaliate against the community/society which the VEO claims to represent
  - Indirect Punishment
    - Against state sponsors/enablers
    - Against private supporters/enablers
- Non-military Deterrence/Coercion
  - Denial
    - Strategic
    - Operational
    - Tactical
  - Alternative (non-military) Punishment Threats
    - Legal (e.g., arrest and imprisonment)
    - Financial sanctions
- Bargaining/Negotiations/Dialogue
  - Negotiations
    - With the VEO as a whole
    - With Third Parties who can influence the VEO

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<sup>4</sup> Davis, Paul, and Brian Jenkins. 2002. *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 9-10. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2005/MR1619.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1619.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Davis, Paul, and Brian Jenkins. 2002. *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 14-15. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2005/MR1619.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1619.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson. 2011. "I-VEO Empirical Assessment: Literature Review and Knowledge Matrix." College Park, MD: START, 16.

<sup>7</sup> Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson. 2011. "I-VEO Empirical Assessment: Literature Review and Knowledge Matrix." College Park, MD: START, 15.

- Attempts to identify and separate out moderates
- Dialogue
  - Promote dialogue among groups
- Persuasion and Counternarrative
  - Persuasion
    - Deradicalization
- Deterrence by Counternarrative/Delegitimation
  - WMD focus
- Positive Incentives/Opening Up Alternative Options
  - Economic Development & Incentives
  - Opportunities for Peaceful Political Change
    - Democracy promotion

Finally, a simplified schema was developed for the project, including the following:

- Coercion: including strategies based on violence or the threat of violence;
- Denial: including strategies intended to raise the costs of attacks or lower the benefits to reduce the likelihood of violence;
- Delegitimization: including strategies aimed at undermining the legitimacy of violent organizations;
- Incentivization: including strategies aimed at increasing interest in or viability of nonviolent pathways to change; and
- No action.<sup>8</sup>

Given the scarcity of literature with empirical testing (discussed below), especially in regards to the African context, the simplified schema above was adopted for this effort. Additionally, a simplified schema to denote influence target, including groups/members, supporters/sympathizers, and broader publics, was adopted.

### **Literature Identification and Extraction**

A two-stage process was employed to identify relevant literature and extract key information to be synthesized. Under the previous I-VEO effort, START led a comprehensive literature review effort on 190 hypotheses from across the social sciences. Hypotheses, clustered into themes, were assessed in terms of both theoretical development and empirical assessment. Of the 190 hypotheses, 54 were found to have no empirical support in the literature while an additional 59 had been tested multiple times, but with contradictory results.<sup>9</sup> As a first step, researchers first re-visited the I-VEO report and accompanying

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<sup>8</sup> Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson. 2011. "I-VEO Empirical Assessment: Literature Review and Knowledge Matrix." College Park, MD: START, 16.

<sup>9</sup> Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson. 2011. "I-VEO Empirical Assessment: Literature Review and Knowledge Matrix." College Park, MD: START.



knowledge matrix.<sup>10</sup> Rather than replicating the previous effort, only the hypotheses with relatively high empirical support are reviewed here.

Given the focus of the current project on the African continent, researcher assistants then conducted systematic searches, using primarily Google Scholar, to ensure all relevant literature was reviewed. Each research assistant was assigned a discrete set of years (2013-2014, 2000-2012, prior to 2000) and instructed to review the first 10 pages of results from the search string “Africa AND (counterinsurgency OR counterterrorism OR ‘countering violent extremism’).” Research assistants assessed each potential source based on its abstract and procured those that seemed likely to include descriptions of discrete policy actions, along with assessments of those actions. They then extracted from the sources information on policies where the stated purpose was to undermine the capacity or the motivation of non-state actors to engage in political violence. Information collected included a description of any policy, a summary of any outcomes or assessments of the policy, as well as a description of how the authors measured outcomes and/or the methods by which assessment was made. This method yielded approximately 70 sources, of which around 60 included at least a description of some counter-terrorism policy. However, relatively few of the sources included assessments of policy success or reported the results of social scientific evaluation of policy outcomes.

## **Literature**

This section is organized by both type of influence policy (coercion, denial, delegitimization, and incentivization). In each section, I first review key findings from the earlier I-VEO project (with a global focus) before reviewing additional sources that are specific to the African continent.

### **Coercion**

Within the counter-terrorism literature, the use of coercive methods against violent extremists is the most common focus of analysis. As defined above, coercive methods rely on the use or threat of violence to counter extremist violence. Examples of coercive methods include military assaults, targeted assassinations, and revenge killings.

A majority of studies find that use of coercive methods such as repression (especially when used exclusively) tend to produce backlash effects. For example, in a quantitative study of the relationship between repressive acts and terrorist incidents, Chenoweth and Dugan find that repression across target types in one month increases the risk of terrorism the following month.<sup>11</sup> A similar study focused on the West Bank and Gaza by Marwan also finds that heavy-handed repression spurs, rather than suppresses,

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<sup>10</sup> The I-VEO Knowledge Matrix is available online at <http://start.foxtrotdev.com>. This tool allows users to enter the literature from a variety of points (e.g., by hypothesis, by type of influence operation, by target of influence operation, etc.) and access micro-literature reviews.

<sup>11</sup> Chenoweth, Erica, and Laura Dugan. 2011. “Does Repression Decrease Terrorist Attacks? Evidence from Israel.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, March 15-19.

collective action.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, qualitative studies by Young<sup>13</sup> and Rasler<sup>14</sup> find that although repression against VEOs may have short-term effects in reducing violent extremism, the long-term effect is to produce backlash. Several studies also find that indiscriminate repression – so repression that also targets the broader public – increases popular support for violent extremists.<sup>15</sup> However, repression may be effective when carried out by more autocratic governments.<sup>16</sup>

There has been limited focus on the state's use of irregular forces or privatized security in coercion, a topic that is of particular relevance in Africa.<sup>17</sup> For example, Hughes and Tripodi find mixed results for the use of home guards and militias to apply coercive pressure on VEOs, noting some success in the Philippines, Kenya, Peru, and Thailand but failure in Algeria and Vietnam.<sup>18</sup> Conversely, the state's use of largely unmanaged gangs both failed to reduce insurgency and also posed long-term obstacles to the state's claim to a monopoly on violence.<sup>19</sup>

Evaluations of coercive policies deployed against VEOs in the African context are also pessimistic. For example, using process-tracing methodology, Hoehne finds that foreign military intervention in Somalia resulted in the unification of a previously fragmented Islamist movement and hastened the development of a hardened jihadi organization in the form of al-Shabaab.<sup>20</sup> In the Nigerian context, case analysis of the impact of the May 2013 declaration of the state of emergency and influx of military personnel into the northeast, while it did produce a constriction in the geographic scope of Boko Haram, had no effect on the frequency of Boko Haram attacks, while lethality increased.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Khawaja, Marwan. 1993. "Repression and popular collective action: Evidence from the West Bank." *Sociological Forum*, 8:1, 47-71.

<sup>13</sup> Young, Joseph. 2008. "Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War: States, Dissidents and the Production of Violent Conflict." PhD thesis, Florida State University.

<sup>14</sup> Rasler, Karen. 1996. "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 61:1, 132-152.

<sup>15</sup> LaFree, Gary, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte. 2009. "The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models." *Criminology*, 47:1, 17-45; Young, Joe. 2007. "Iron Fists or Velvet Gloves? Evaluating Competing Approaches to Counterinsurgency." Paper presented at ISA Annual Conference.

<sup>16</sup> Gupta, Dipak, Harinder Singh, and Tom Sprague. 1993. "Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37: 301-339; Lyall, Jason. 2009. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53:3, 331-362.

<sup>17</sup> Roessler, Philip G. 2005. "Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda." *Comparative Politics*, 37:2, 207-227. <http://www.start.umd.edu/careers/postdoctoral-research-associates-computational-social-science-and-or-computational>.

<sup>18</sup> Hughes, Geraint, and Christian Tripodi. 2009. "Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 20:1, 1-35, DOI: 10.1080/09592310802571552

<sup>19</sup> Hughes, Geraint, and Christian Tripodi. 2009. "Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 20:1, 1-35, DOI: 10.1080/09592310802571552

<sup>20</sup> Hoehne, Markus Virgil. 2010. "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped to Produce Militant Islamism." Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. [http://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia\\_Hoehne\\_v10.pdf](http://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Akpan, Felix, and Okonette Ekanem. 2014. "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria." *Canadian Social Science* 10:2, 151-155.

## Denial

Denial strategies intend to increase the costs for violent groups or reduce the benefits of their attacks. This can include, for example, hardening potential targets of attack. Within the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency literature, the primary focus of analysis has been on specific protective measures (such as the installation of metal detectors at airports). Evidence from this literature suggests that such measures, while they may result in a decrease of attacks at that particular location or against a given type of target, do not result in overall decreases in attacks.<sup>22</sup> In other words, while risks may be decreased at hardened targets, softer targets see an increased risk of attack.

Denial strategies may also be broader in focus, such as seen in attempts to increase border controls or to build state capacity in previously neglected or ungoverned spaces to deny access to terrorist or insurgent groups. These broader denial strategies have been the analytic focus for those assessing counter-terrorism in the African context. Results seem to be mixed. While international cooperation within the Horn of Africa has been evaluated as experiencing moderate success,<sup>23</sup> at least in the short- and medium-term,<sup>24</sup> little empirical evidence of success has been found for similar efforts within the Sahel.<sup>25</sup>

## Delegitimization

Delegitimization strategies seek to undermine the legitimacy of violent groups. This may include delegitimizing the ideology of a group, its goals, or its methods. Examples range from deradicalization programs deployed in prisons to social media campaigns highlighting the brutality of some groups to religious education programs that highlight nonviolent interpretations of religious texts. Most programming under the “countering violent extremism” moniker would be classified as delegitimization.

Deradicalization programs, especially those run in prisons, are the primary delegitimization effort targeting group leaders and members that has been subjected to empirical evaluation. Blaydes and Rubin found that expanded religious and basic education did foster ideological reorientation away from violent extremism in their study on deradicalization programs in Egypt.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, in a study of LTTE detainees participating in a deradicalization program in Sri Lanka, Kruglanski and Gelfand found that detainees’ support for both the LTTE and for armed struggle decreased over time. This trend was consistent across treatment groups, which included participants who received vocational training and counseling, those

<sup>22</sup> Dugan, Laura, Gary LaFree, and Alex R. Piquero. 2005. “Testing a Rational Choice Model of Airline Hijackings.” *Criminology*, 34: 1031-1066; Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. 1993. “The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis.” *American Political Science Review*, 87:4, 829-844; Lum, Cynthia, Leslie Kennedy, and Alison Sherley. 2006. “Are Counter-Terrorism Strategies Effective? The Results of the Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Research.” *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 2: 489-516.

<sup>23</sup> Berschinski, Robert. 2007. “AFRICOM’ Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism’, ‘Capacity Building’, Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa.” U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.

<sup>24</sup> Shinn, David. 2004. “Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn.” *Foreign Service Journal*, 81:9 (September), 36-42.

<sup>25</sup> Zoubir, Yahia H. 2009. “The United States and Maghreb-Sahel security.” *International Affairs*, 85:5, 977-995.

<sup>26</sup> Blaydes, Lisa, and Lawrence Rubin. 2008. “Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20:4, 461-479. doi: 10.1080/09546550802257168.

who received more restricted services, and former high-ranking members of the LTTE.<sup>27</sup> However, some research suggests that graduates of such programs need long-term psycho-social support to prevent re-radicalization.<sup>28</sup>

Multiple authors hypothesize that countering extremist narratives is critical to reduce the appeal of violent extremism.<sup>29</sup> Previous research has established that VEOs lose popular support with key constituencies when they overreach or miscalculate the public relations impact of attacks on certain targets.<sup>30</sup> This suggests, at a minimum, that strategic communication campaigns highlighting or framing the targeting choices of VEOs as illegitimate could result in a decrease of popular support.

To date, however, there has been very little scholarship in terms of empirical studies to test the efficacy of counter-narratives in general or of specific strategic communication programs or content. However, one of the few empirical evaluations focused on radio programming in Mali, Chad, and Niger. Aldrich, using survey data, found that individuals who listened to radio programs with a CVE focus on “peace and tolerance” changed their perspectives and behavior in measurable and positive ways, including expressing greater support for counter-terrorism cooperation with the West and more frequent civic participation.<sup>31</sup>

## Incentivization

Incentivizing strategies focus on increasing payoffs for nonviolent behavior. Examples include negotiations and providing material benefits to buy-off fighters, supporters, or potential recruits.

Incentivization strategies with group leaders or members as the target include negotiations and amnesty programs. Studies of negotiations find mixed results. While negotiations sometimes result in decreased violence, attempts at cross-national, generalizable studies have not found negotiations to have a significant effect on political violence. Furthermore, there is evidence that violent groups in weak states

<sup>27</sup> Kruglanski, Arie, and Michele Gelfand. 2013. “Report on Psychological Correlates of Radical Beliefs among Sri Lankan and Philippine Detainees,” Preliminary Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START.

<sup>28</sup> Rabasa, Angel, Stacie Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez, and Christopher Boucek. 2010. *Deradicalizing Islamic Extremists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

<sup>29</sup> Casebeer, William D., and James A Russell. 2005. “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘counternarrative Strategy.’” *Strategic Insights*, 4:3, 1-16; Knopf, Jeffrey W. 2010. “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.” *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31:1, 1-33; Speckhard, Anne. 2007. “De-Legitimizing Terrorism: Creative Engagement and Understanding of the Psychosocial Processes Involved in Ideological Support for Terrorism.” *Connections*. Winter Issue.

<sup>30</sup> Ashour, Omar. 2009. *The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*. London, England: Routledge; Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2009. *How Terrorism Ends*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Dugan, Laura, Julie Y. Huang, Gary LaFree, and Clark McCauley. 2008. “Sudden Desistance from Terrorism: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.” *Dynamics of Asymmetric*, 1:3, 231-249.

<sup>31</sup> Aldrich, Daniel P. 2012. “Radio as the Voice of God: Peace and Tolerance Radio Programming’s Impact on Norms.” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6:6, 34-59.

are less likely to honor commitments made during negotiations.<sup>32</sup> Some studies have found that amnesty programs can be successful, although they are certainly not uniformly successful.<sup>33</sup>

Incentivization strategies directed towards supporters/sympathizers or broader publics include social service provision, economic development initiatives, increasing dialogue across societal cleavages, and expanding opportunities to participate in political decision-making. Many studies along these lines are more focused on macro, structural variables and analyses comparing levels of political violence in societies, for example, that are more democratic versus less democratic, or where states provide better social services versus worse social services.<sup>34</sup> There are some more micro-focused studies. For example, one carefully designed study found that when the U.S. increased provision of social welfare in Iraq, attacks against U.S. forces there.<sup>35</sup>

In the African context, there has been little focus on incentivization strategies. One study found that amnesty was a critical factor in decisions by some commanders of the Lord's Resistance Army to leave that group and return to civilian life.<sup>36</sup> Analyses of the peace process in the Niger Delta have found that material incentives and an amnesty program resulted in at least short-term reductions in violence.<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusions

The current state of the counter-terrorism literature is characterized by more gaps and questions than answers. Some of the main shortcomings of the literature which will be discussed include:

- Shortage of empirical analyses of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and CVE policies and programs;
- Geographic constraints in analytic foci;

<sup>32</sup> Bapat, Navin. 2006. "State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups." *International Studies Quarterly* 50:1, 213-229; Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2009. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>33</sup> Campbell, Kurt M., and Richard Weitz. 2005. *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies*. The Princeton Papers Project. 14-15.

<https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/counterinsurgency.pdf>; Rabasa, Angel, Stacie Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez, and Christopher Boucek. 2010. *Deradicalizing Islamic Extremists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

<sup>34</sup> Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. "Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is There a Casual Connection?" *National Bureau of Economic Research* 9074; Li, Quan. 2005. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:2, 278-297; Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. 2004. "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A Pooled Time Series Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 230-58; Newman, Edward. 2006. "Exploring the Root Causes of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29:749-772; Ross, Jeffrey Ian 1993. "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model." *Journal of Peace Research* 30: 317-329.

<sup>35</sup> Berman, Eli, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter. 2008. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq." *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 14606*. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14606>.

<sup>36</sup> *Coming Home: Understanding Why Commanders of the Lord's Resistance Army Choose to Return to Civilian Life.* 2006. Conciliation Resources and Quaker Peace and Social Witness. [http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/ComingHome\\_200605\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/ComingHome_200605_ENG.pdf).

<sup>37</sup> Oluwaniyi, Oluwatonyin O. 2011. "Post-Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta: Challenges and Prospects." *Conflict Trends*. 46-54; Okonofua, Benjamin A. 2011. *Paths to Peacebuilding: Amnesty and the Niger Delta Violence*. Dissertation, Georgia State University. [http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/sociology\\_diss/62](http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/sociology_diss/62).



- Lack of attention to path dependence; and
- Relative absence of boundary and limit testing of findings.

First, within the literature as a whole, there is a shortage of rigorously designed empirical analyses. As previously found under the I-VEO effort, many hypotheses regarding influence operations have either not been empirically tested or have been supported merely through anecdotes. This is especially true regarding non-coercive strategies. While efforts are underway to increase the number of research efforts and collaboration among them,<sup>38</sup> it will take some time to populate the field with social scientific evaluations.

Second, a few number of cases, such as Israel, have received a disproportionate share of analytic attention. Cases that are of strategic interest to countries such as the United States (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan) or that present fewer challenges in obtaining data (e.g., Northern Ireland) tend to be the subject of more studies. While this provides for better understanding of those few cases, it limits tests of generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, studies tend to focus on a single geographic or a few closely related geographic locations. The lack of cross-national comparative studies also hinders the quest for generalizability.

The third and fourth points are somewhat related. Although most countries faced with terrorism or other forms of political violence deploy multiple policies to counter it, many studies focus almost exclusively on one type of intervention and do not consider how the ordering of state responses may impact outcomes. There is also a lack of boundary and limit tests of findings. For example, does it matter what the source (e.g., national government, local forces, or international forces) of repression is in determining the impact of that repression on levels of political violence? Although the field is still relatively new, and thus focused on uncovering more basic relationships, as the field grows and matures, it will be necessary to engage in this type of probing analysis to develop robust findings.

The state of play in the academic literature regarding counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and countering violent extremism creates difficulties for providing robust guidance to policymakers regarding policy options. However, the analysis of the literature provided in this report does suggest some advice. First, repression – especially indiscriminate repression – is unlikely to work in the long-term and may produce backlash effects that result in more, rather than less, political violence. Second, hardening targets, while it may make attacks on those targets less likely, may result in violent extremists shifting their targeting strategy rather than reducing their overall level of violence.

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<sup>38</sup> See, for example, the Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Radicalization research database maintained by the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University. <http://www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu/index.php?pagina=>.